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ABSTRACT
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
creasing global focus on safe and sustainable development. The industry standard, and fundamental benchmark for a 
tailings storage facility, is to provide ‘safe, stable, and economical storage of tailings presenting negligible public health 
and safety risks and acceptably low social and environmental impacts during operation and post-closure’.
Geotechnical stability is a key consideration in many tailings dam failures, and monitoring and instrumentation of tai-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
meters that may mitigate the risks and potential consequences of tailings dam failures. This paper discusses the out-
comes of a back-analysis of state-of-the art slope monitoring techniques undertaken at a number of sites at Samarco 





BIGGER: higher stresses, higher strains, higher consequences;
FASTER: higher pore pressures, static liquefaction, rushed constructed, less observed time; and
LONGER LASTING: Mine closure halts operation, but the waste facility still stands. Time-dependent deterioration 
?????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ???? ???????? ??????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????? ???????????????????????????
probability of 1 in 700 to 1 in 1,750) (LeProude, 2015; Davies et al., 2002a). Comparatively, the estimated annual pro-
bability of failure for a conventional dam is 1 in 10,000 (Davies et al., 2002a).
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
failures are in the United States of America (USA) and Chile, which are anticipated to be elevated due to the number of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
as will be conveyed in this paper, by the metrics of best value. The likelihood and consequence of dam failure in terms 




value is realised where gained knowledge has contributed to improved engineering practice, in turn decreasing the 
number of dam failures from 77 in 1960 through to 1990, to 15 between 1990 and present day.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
released, reiterating that there is still work to be done. The value of education and resilience in Chile has seen the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ???????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
failures, 200 reported deaths, and 2.5 million cubic metres of reported release as a result.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
This state, roughly the size of France, is responsible for most of the country’s iron ore production, and thus has the 
biggest concentration of tailings dams in Brazil. Most of the failures were found to be related to liquefaction as the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
method is the predominant method for dam construction in Brazil. Also, as Brazil was mostly considered non-seismic 
until recently, dynamic analyses are still incipient in the country and there are no acts or regulations that require dyna-
mic loadings to be taken into account in dam design. 
In recognising cases such as that where Brazil is unfamiliar to design considerations to which Chile has advanced, 
geotechnical information pertinent to increasing the knowledge and understanding of in-situ failure risk analysis should 
be shared in consideration of safety, livelihood, reputation, and best standard practice. This is anticipated to allow a 
global reach of geotechnical engineers to design, construct, operate, and maintain these structures responsibly. A 
communal approach from all tiers of geotechnical personnel for the betterment of stakeholder safety embraces mul-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
failure case studies from Samarco Mine in Minas Gerais, Brazil. With a focus on state-of-the-art monitoring techniques, 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and ultimately the ability to anticipate and respond promptly to tailings dam instabilities are anticipated.
2. SITE CHARACTERISATION AND BACKGROUND
MINE BACKGROUND
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Americas, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Samarco currently operates under a 50-50 joint venture arrangement 
between Vale S.A. and BHP Billiton Brasil Ltda.
At the time of this paper, Samarco was embedded in, and committed to the social, environmental, and economic 
recovery of regions impacted by failure of the Fundão dam in late 2015. As part of this recovery, and in line with the 
recommendations introduced, Samarco bears a self-induced responsibility and obligation to share learnings. An open 
discussion with both national and international peers increases awareness of the risks, and how interpretation of pre-
vious events at this mine can contribute to a safer environment.  
DAM AND SLOPE CHARACTERISTICS





nitoring solutions. The only comparable data was that from the weather station.
SANTARÉM DAM
Santarém Dam is located 3 km downstream of Fundão dam (Figure 1). Santarém Dam is designed as a civil gravity 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????




Dike 2 is located 500 m upstream of Dike 1 of the Fundão dam (Figure 1). Internal to the Fundão reservoir, Dike 2 was 
designed to retain the slimes component of the tailings, while sands were retained by Dike 1, both of which failed in 
???????????????????????????????????3 of material remaining within Fundão after the failure, the majority were slimes 
situated upstream of the breached Dike 2. In January 2016, 1,000,000 m3 of this material was mobilised from the 
reservoir as a result of heavy rainfall, which carried downstream uninterrupted to overtop Santarém Dam. With repair 
works underway on the downstream Dike 1, the risk of failure of the adjacent Selinha Dike, surrounding natural slopes, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????







for failure of the circular shear failure during monitoring.




ty, where sensitivity analyses in computer modelling established the water table levels at which intervening action was 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
to determine.
Back-analysis of in-situ behaviours represents one of the most valuable approaches in establishing movement trig-





Santarém Dam. The basis of selection was those thresholds that allowed for greater warning prior to the event occu-
rring. The threshold values for radar monitoring, and responses for each threshold level are summarised in Table I. It 
is important to acknowledge that movement velocities are reported as opposed to magnitude, as it is the accelerated 
change of movement that is the critical indicator of failure in the short term, with large movements over a longer dura-
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????














M o n i t o r i n g 
centre techni-
cian
Validate the reading against 
????????? ??????????? ????????
tions*. 
If validated to be true, alert 
the geotechnical engineer 
of all known information by 
email.
As per yellow res-
ponse, but also 
contact geotech-
nical engineer by 
phone, promptly.




If reading is validated, per-











Issue report to key 
stakeholders. 
Immediately to the monito-
ring centre.
Evaluate threshold reading 
and surrounding instru-
mentation.
Consider safety and feasi-
???????????????????????????
Issue report as per yellow 
trigger.




LOCAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS
Samarco abides by national law, called Portaria, which is authored by the National Department of Mineral Production 
and sets the standard for dam safety in Brazil. Portaria 416, released in September 2012, was vague in terms of moni-
toring and instrumentation requirements, stating only that readings from the instrumentation must be made available to 




???? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
the monitoring requirements from Portaria 416 remain, the following requirements have been added:
• Every dam must have a monitoring system that allows the company to assess dam safety;
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
• For dams deemed of high consequence, the monitoring system must be real time, and must have video came-
ras, both monitored 24 hours a day, seven days a week; and
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ternal consultant. 




resolutions; a lesser temporal resolution (considering data averaged over longer time periods) will give smooth data, 
but less accurate trending, while a greater temporal resolution has the potential to be distorted by data ‘noise’ in the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Mine, and the applicability of these in anticipating the failure event. These are represented by “Velocity over calculation 
period” parameters in this report. These are compared against cumulative displacement of the scanned target: a direct 
output of the radar technology.
SUMMARY OF MONITORING DATA FINDINGS
Santarém Dam 
A minor local failure was observed on the spillway area at Santarém Dam on 12 June, 2016, at which time the slope 
was being monitored by slope stability radar (Figure 2). The material was displaced along a slip plane that formed two 






increase in water pressure” (Darling, 2011). The month of June was unusually wet; 72mm of rainfall was recorded 
between June 1 and June 12,  which is compared to the negligible rainfall that characteristically occurs during these 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other visual anomalies were detected. 
Figure 2 - Slope stability radar monitoring for Santarem Dam, showing location of local failure
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
yellow, orange, and red alarms, respectively (Table II). In consideration of the responses designated for each alarm as 
seen in Table I, this degree of notice presents a safe and feasible response time. 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ?????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ???????????????? ???? ???????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ???????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the increase yet not escalating the alarm beyond what a regressive trend warrants.
????????? ???? ??????????????????? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????? ?????????
deration of all velocity calculation periods over the entire duration that the same radar that captured that failure was 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
Figure 3 - Velocity and deformation data trending for Santarém Dam, velocity alarm thresholds shown
Table II - Velocity alarm assessment for Santarém Dam












????? ??? ??? ??? 6.5 - 
????? 5.5 5.2 4.9 3.9 -
????? 5.1 4.4 3.9 2.5 -
????? 4.1 3.7 3.0 1.5 -
????? 3.0 2.1 ??? 0.6 -
????? ??? 1.5 1.1 0.2 -
????? 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.1 -
????? 1.3 0.5 0.2 - -
????? 0.4 0.2 0.1 - -







It is anticipated that loose, saturated slimes comprising high proportions of clay- and silt-sized particles remained after 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ??????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
through the material; the same forces that failed an upstream earthen buttress by erosion piping two months prior. 
In the author’s assessment, mass collapse of the material may have been observed as a result of progressive erosion 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an elevated moisture content and the associated decrease in shear strength of the slimes. In terms of the data, this 






Figure 4 - Slope stability radar monitoring for Dike 2, showing location of slimes collapse
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Table V). This degree of notice presents a safe and feasible response time. Unlike Santarém Dam, this failure was 
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Figure 5 – Velocity and deformation data trending for Dike 2, velocity alarm thresholds shown
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?m??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?
?m??? ???? ???? ???? ? ?
?m??? ???? ???? ???? ? ?
??m??? ???? ???? ???? ? ?
Eixo 1 – Natural Slope
Local, regressive-progressive deformation processes were observed to be drivers behind the dislodgement of material 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
failure was 7.5 days.
The slope material comprised large quantities of loose rock, initially intact but anticipated to have weathered and de-
graded over time. Two primary mechanisms are anticipated to have driven the regressive-progressive failure of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
slope became susceptible to further degradation from weathering, in turn entering a cycle of progressive instability. 
This is evidenced by the successive recorded events, all of similar behaviour, in addition to the incremental trend of 
movement along a preferential deformation path down the side of the slope (Figure 6).
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
60 triggered a yellow alarm half an hour prior to failure, however could easily be missed if read without the knowledge 
that a failure were about to occur. No orange alarms were triggered. 






Time before event (hours)
Trigger Level ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ??????????
1mm 1.4 23.4 ???? 23.6
2mm 1.0 1.1 ???? 22.5
3mm 0.6 ??? 20.6 19.1
4mm 0.4 0.6 ???? ???
5mm 0.1 0.3 19.5 0.4
6mm - 0.0 19.1 0.1
7mm - - ???? -
??? - - 9.6 -
9mm - - 0.3 -
10mm - - 0.0 -
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
trend, and remained above the trigger level until failure.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
movement over previous hours will capture the regressive trend prior, lagging current movement trends by a number 






It is anticipated that geotechnical engineering judgement will be applied to the deformation assessment approach, 
both on setup for conditional suitability of the alarm, and on response should it trigger. While this deformation trigger 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????






Pertinent opportunities that can be derived from the data from the three events comprise:
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
hours prior to failure. The triggers allowed for, at minimum, one hours’ warning on red alarm prior to failure;
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
were progressing toward a failure event. In this scenario, a second deformation metric was recommended in 
order to validate the velocity triggers which allowed 1.4 and 1 hours’ warning on yellow and orange alarms, 
respectively;
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
vely identify and respond appropriately to slope instability;









ce, understanding of site conditions, and how these relate to an understanding of the plausible failure mechanisms 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????




• Wet weather, although often associated with geotechnical instabilities, can also produce ‘noisy’ radar data on 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
is recorded as movement during the scan.




a single parameter assessment. It is anticipated that correlation of deformation parameters with other instrumentation 
readings would be valuable in future development of monitoring strategies.




Developing a database of site events, their trending, and the associated implications is a tool readily accessible to 
civil, mine, and geotechnical operators, globally. The more back-analysis that is completed on these events, the more 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????




database of failure analyses.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
appropriate responses to take place, with evacuation of the slope area prompted at least 1.3 hours prior to failure. For 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
missed. A second level of check was introduced in form of a deformation alarm, which aids to validate the velocity 
reading when used under the correct application.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
up to 42 hours prior to the event. The recommendation is made that applied understanding of failure mechanisms, 
back-analysis of monitoring and instrumentation data in terms of this, and ultimately the development of threshold 
triggers to prompt appropriate response should be readily integrated with the dam monitoring strategy. 
In developing the dam monitoring strategy, case studies shared by other operators should be considered. With a safety 
????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
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